03.1-Chapter 3 Of Mixed Princedoms part1-mt

Chapter 3 Of Mixed Princedomspart1

But in new Princedomsdifficulties abound. And, first, if the Princedom be not wholly new, but joinedon to the ancient dominions of the Prince, so as to form with them what may betermed a mixed Princedom, changes will come from a cause common to all newStates, namely, that men, thinking to better their condition, are always readyto change masters, and in this expectation will take up arms against any ruler;wherein they deceive themselves, and find afterwards by experience that theyare worse off than before. This again results naturally and necessarily fromthe circumstance that the Prince cannot avoid giving offence to his newsubjects, either in respect of the troops he quarters on them, or of some otherof the numberless vexations attendant on a new acquisition. And in this way youmay find that you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizingthe Princedom, yet cannot keep the friendship of those who helped you to gainit; since you can neither reward them as they expect, nor yet, being underobligations to them, use violent remedies against them. For however strong youmay be in respect of your army, it is essential that in entering a new Provinceyou should have the good will of its inhabitants.

Hence it happened thatLouis XII of France, speedily gaining possession of Milan, as speedily lost it;and that on the occasion of its first capture, Lodovico Sforza was able withhis own forces only to take it from him. For the very people who had opened thegates to the French King, when they found themselves deceived in theirexpectations and hopes of future benefits, could not put up with the insolenceof their new ruler.

True it is that when aState rebels and is again got under, it will not afterwards be lost so easily.For the Prince, using the rebellion as a pretext, will not scruple to securehimself by punishing the guilty, bringing the suspected to trial, and otherwisestrengthening his position in the points where it was weak. So that if torecover Milan from the French it was enough on the first occasion that a DukeLodovico should raise alarms on the frontiers to wrest it from them a secondtime the whole world had to be ranged against them, and their armies destroyedand driven out of Italy. And this for the reasons above assigned. And yet, fora second time, Milan was lost to the King.

The general causes of itsfirst loss have been shown. It remains to note the causes of the second, and topoint out the remedies which the French King had, or which might have been usedby another in like circumstances to maintain his conquest more successfullythan he did. I say, then, that those States which upon their acquisition arejoined on to the ancient dominions of the Prince who acquires them, are eitherof the same Province and tongue as the people of these dominions, or they arenot. When they are, there is a great ease in retaining them, especially whenthey have not been accustomed to live in freedom. To hold them securely it isenough to have rooted out the line of the reigning Prince; because if in otherrespects the old condition of things be continued, and there be no discordancein their customs, men live peaceably with one another, as we see to have beenthe case in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have so long beenunited to France. For although there be some slight difference in theirlanguages, their customs are similar, and they can easily get on together. He,therefore, who acquires such a State, if he mean to keep it, must see to twothings; first, that the blood of the ancient line of Princes be destroyed;second, that no change be made in respect of laws or taxes; for in this way thenewly acquired State speedily becomes incorporated with the hereditary.

But when States areacquired in a country differing in language, usages, and laws, difficultiesmultiply, and great good fortune, as well as address, is needed to overcomethem. One of the best and most efficacious methods for dealing with such aState, is for the Prince who acquires it to go and dwell there in person, sincethis will tend to make his tenure more secure and lasting. This course has beenfollowed by the Turk with regard to Greece, who, had he not, in addition to allhis other precautions for securing that Province, himself come to live in it,could never have kept his hold of it. For when you are on the spot, disordersare detected in their beginnings and remedies can be readily applied; but whenyou are at a distance, they are not heard of until they have gathered strengthand the case is past cure. Moreover, the Province in which you take up yourabode is not pillaged by your officers; the people are pleased to have a readyrecourse to their Prince; and have all the more reason if they are welldisposed, to love, if disaffected, to fear him. A foreign enemy desiring toattack that State would be cautious how he did so. In short, where the Princeresides in person, it will be extremely difficult to oust him.

新生的君主国会出现种种困难。首先需要指出的是，这种君主国并不是全新的，而只是部分地更新，因此，从整体上说来，它可以被称作混合型国家。那里发生的变故主要产生于一个固有的难题，而这个难题在所有新生君主国里都是显而易见的：本来，人们乐于更换统治者以图改善自身的处境，这种愿望促使他们拿起武器反抗他们的统治者，但事与愿违，他们的处境更糟了，而这种局面是由另一种自然的、通常是必然的情况所致，即新君主带来的军队常常会侵害他的新臣民，而且出于征服的需要，新君主也常常会给新臣民施以无数的压制。因此，在你占有这个君主国之后，所有被你损害的人将统统变成你的敌人；你也留不住那些把你请进来的朋友们，因为你不能遂其所愿，同时，你还不能使用强硬手段对付他们，因为你对他们欠了人情债。一个新君主即使拥有十分强大的军队，在进入一个新区时也应当争取当地居民的好感。

正是出于这些原因，法王路易十二虽然迅速占领了米兰，却又迅速丢失了米兰。第一次收复米兰，只需洛多维科 [1] 的军队就够了，因为人民不能容忍路易的胡作非为，虽然他们曾为这位新君主打开过城门，但随后却发现自己原来的看法和期待的利益不过是一厢情愿。

然而，事实上，一个新统治者如能将叛乱地区再度征服，他将再也不会轻易地丧师失地，因为叛乱给他提供了机会，使他能够毫不犹豫地惩办罪犯，清查可疑分子，并在最薄弱的地方加强戒备。因此，导致法王第一次丧失米兰的不过是一个洛多维科公爵在边境上揭竿而起，但要再次把法王从米兰赶走，那就只有动员全世界去反对他，并须歼灭他的军队或将其逐出意大利，原因已如上述。不过，米兰毕竟已两次从他手里被夺了回来。

法王第一次丢失米兰的一般原因已经讨论过了，现在来谈谈第二次的原因，看他能否设法不至于再度丢掉米兰，以及别人如果处在他的地位能否棋高一着、巩固征服的成果。那些被他征服后又合并过来的国家，也许属于同一地区、使用同一语言，也许两者都不是。如果是，特别是它们如果没有体验过自由生活的话，保有这些国家就轻而易举，征服者只需切断它们君主的血统，就可以安如磐石；至于其他方面，只要尊重他们的传统，不去改变他们的风习，人们会继续若无其事地生活下去。这就是布列塔尼、勃艮第、加斯科涅和诺曼底的情形，它们早就属于法兰西了，尽管语言仍有差异，但风习相同，因而很容易和睦相处。征服了这些国家之后，统治者如果决意保持统治，就应确保做到两点：一是要彻底消灭它们的旧君家族，二是不要改变它们的法律和税赋。这样去做了，就会在极短的时间内使它们同统治者的故国融为一体。

但是，如果被征服的新国家有着不同的语言、风习和制度，麻烦就出现了，征服者必须有极好的运气和极高的技巧才能维持统治。最好的、也是最有效的办法之一，就是征服者亲自驻扎在那些国家，这将使他的征服更持久、更稳固，土耳其人在希腊就是这么干的。 [2] 假如土耳其国王没有亲临希腊，无论他采取什么办法想保有那个国家，都将难以奏效。你只有驻在当地，才能明察秋毫并防患于未然，否则，等发生严重事态之后再去补救，那就难乎其难了。而且，有你在，你的官吏就不会掠夺那个国家，你的臣民也会因为能够直接求助于君主而感到满足。因此，那些愿做良民的人们会更加爱戴你，别有所图的人则会害怕你，想要进犯这个国家的人也将踌躇不前。总之，只要君主驻在那个国家，他就绝不可能轻易失守。