03.2-Chapter 3 Of Mixed Princedoms part2-mt

Chapter 3 Of Mixed Princedomspart2

Another excellent expedientis to send colonies into one or two places, so that these may become, as itwere, the keys of the Province; for you must either do this, or else keep up anumerous force of men-at-arms and foot soldiers. A Prince need not spend muchon colonies. He can send them out and support them at little or no charge tohimself, and the only persons to whom he gives offence are those whom hedeprives of their fields and houses to bestow them on the new inhabitants.Those who are thus injured form but a small part of the community, andremaining scattered and poor can never become dangerous. All others being leftunmolested, are in consequence easily quieted, and at the same time are afraidto make a false move, lest they share the fate of those who have been deprivedof their possessions. In few words, these colonies cost less than soldiers, aremore faithful, and give less offence, while those who are offended, being, as Ihave said, poor and dispersed, cannot hurt.

And let it here be noted thatmen are either to be kindly treated, or utterly crushed, since they can revengelighter injuries, but not graver. Wherefore the injury we do to a man should beof a sort to leave no fear of reprisals.

But if instead of coloniesyou send troops, the cost is vastly greater, and the whole revenues of thecountry are spent in guarding it; so that the gain becomes a loss, and muchdeeper offence is given; since in shifting the quarters of your soldiers fromplace to place the whole country suffers hardship, which as all feel, all aremade enemies; and enemies who remaining, although vanquished, in their ownhomes, have power to hurt. In every way, therefore, this mode of defence is asdisadvantageous as that by colonizing is useful.

The Prince who establisheshimself in a Province whose laws and language differ from those of his ownpeople, ought also to make himself the head and protector of his feeblerneighbours, and endeavour to weaken the stronger, and must see that by noaccident shall any other stranger as powerful as himself find an entrancethere. For it will always happen that some such person will be called in bythose of the Province who are discontented either through ambition or fear; aswe see of old the Romans brought into Greece by the Aetolians, and in everyother country that they entered, invited there by its inhabitants. And theusual course of things is that so soon as a formidable stranger enters aProvince, all the weaker powers side with him, moved thereto by the illwillthey bear towards him who has hitherto kept them in subjection. So that inrespect of these lesser powers, no trouble is needed to gain them over, for atonce, together, and of their own accord, they throw in their lot with thegovernment of the stranger. The new Prince, therefore, has only to see thatthey do not increase too much in strength, and with his own forces, aided bytheir good will, can easily subdue any who are powerful, so as to remainsupreme in the Province. He who does not manage this matter well, will soonlose whatever he has gained, and while he retains it will find in it endlesstroubles and annoyances.

In dealing with thecountries of which they took possession the Romans diligently followed themethods I have described. They planted colonies, conciliated weaker powerswithout adding to their strength, humbled the great, and never suffered aformidable stranger to acquire influence. A single example will suffice to showthis. In Greece the Romans took the Achaians and Aetolians into their pay; theMacedonian monarchy was humbled; Antiochus was driven out. But the services ofthe Achaians and Aetolians never obtained for them any addition to their power;no persuasions on the part of Philip could induce the Romans to be his friendson the condition of sparing him humiliation; nor could all the power ofAntiochus bring them to consent to his exercising any authority within thatProvince.

And in thus acting theRomans did as all wise rulers should, who have to consider not only presentdifficulties but also future, against which they must use all diligence toprovide; for these, if they be foreseen while yet remote, admit of easy remedy,but if their approach be awaited, are already past cure, the disorder havingbecome hopeless; realizing what the physicians tell us of hectic fever, that inits beginning it is easy to cure, but hard to recognize; whereas, after a time,not having been detected and treated at the first, it becomes easy to recognizebut impossible to cure.

And so it is with Stateaffairs. For the distempers of a State being discovered while yet inchoate,which can only be done by a sagacious ruler, may easily be dealt with; butwhen, from not being observed, they are suffered to grow until they are obviousto every one, there is no longer any remedy. The Romans, therefore, foreseeingevils while they were yet far off, always provided against them, and neversuffered them to take their course for the sake of avoiding war; since theyknew that war is not so to be avoided, but is only postponed to the advantageof the other side. They chose, therefore, to make war with Philip and Antiochusin Greece, that they might not have to make it with them in Italy, although fora while they might have escaped both. This they did not desire, nor did themaxim leave it to Time, which the wise men of our own day have always on theirlips, ever recommend itself to them. What they looked to enjoy were the fruitsof their own valour and foresight. For Time, driving all things before it, maybring with it evil as well as good.

另一个良策就是向那个国家殖民，或者大量派驻重骑兵和步兵，君主须在两者之间择其一，以扼住它的一两个要害之地。而殖民一事，君主无须过多耗资，只要很少费用支出甚至不用支出，就可以殖民驻屯。他所损害的，只是那些为供给殖民者而被没收了田舍的居民，他们在那个国家里是无足轻重的，而且，这些受害的居民由于被驱散到各地，穷不聊生，不可能为害君主。其余的居民，一则由于没有遭到损害而较易安抚，一则由于生怕落到被剥夺财产的境地而心怀恐惧，不敢有过。可以断定，这样的殖民并不费钱，而且比一支驻军更忠诚，更少惹是生非。那些被损害的人，我已经说过，由于穷困潦倒和流离失所，不可能为害统治者。

应当注意的是，要么去善待人们，要么就把他们消灭掉。因为，受到轻微伤害的人还有报复能力，受到沉重伤害，他就无力报复了。所以，要想加害于人，就应害到不必担心会遭其报复的程度。

新君主如果不向被征服地区殖民，而是派遣驻军，那将耗资巨大，因为维持驻军会穷尽那里的全部收入，得不偿失；而且，由于军队到处调动，将因为士兵们到处为非作歹而损害整个国家。对此，人人都会感到恼怒，结果将是人人都与君主为敌。他们虽然遭受压迫，但却仍然守着自己的老家，因而是能够为害的敌人。所以，无论如何，用士兵控制那个地方并无益处，殖民才是可取之策。

一位君主所征服的地区如在语言、风习和制度上不同于本国，就应当在以下诸方面多加用心：使自己成为弱小邻国的首领和保护者，设法削弱较强的邻国，警惕某个同样强大的外国人意外插足。常有这种情况：那些心怀不满的本地人，出于勃勃野心或由于恐惧而把某个外国强人引了进来，就像很久以前埃托利亚人把罗马人引入希腊一样。实际上，罗马人对每个地方的征服，都是那里的当地人勾引过去的。事情往往是这样：一个外国强人一旦侵入一个地区，该地处于弱势的所有居民，都会由于猜忌比自己更强的邻人而依附那位外国强人，因此入侵者只要尊重一下这些弱小势力，把他们笼络过来就没有什么困难，因为他们全都甘愿同已经被他征服的国家融为一体；他需要当心的只是，不要让他们坐大，这样，依靠自己的力量，又有他们的帮助，就很容易镇压强硬势力，从而成为该地区的完全主宰。如果新统治者在这个问题上措置失当，他会很快丧失已经得到的东西，即使他还占有那个地区，也会面临无数困难和烦恼。

罗马人在被他们征服的地区就很注意这些措置。他们派遣殖民，安抚弱国而又不使坐大，镇压强硬势力，不给外国强人可乘之机。毫无疑问，希腊的情形就足以为例：罗马人与亚该亚人和埃托利亚人修好，从而挫败了马其顿王国，赶走了安条克 [3] ，但决不允许亚该亚人或者埃托利亚人居功自大；同时，腓力 [4] 的苦苦相劝也未能诱使罗马人成为他的朋友，罗马人还是打倒了他；安条克尽管还有势力，但罗马人却没让他在那个地区保住一点地盘。在这些情况下，罗马人不唯近忧，更有远虑，在未雨绸缪方面真可谓用尽心机。这正是明君所应有的作为。预见在先，则能防微杜渐；一旦养痈成患，再去救治则为时太晚。消耗热病的情形就是这样。医生们说，此病初起时，是治疗易而诊断难，随着时光荏苒，初期未能诊断又不得治疗的疾病，则变成了诊断易而治疗难。

国家事务亦复如此。只有察祸端于初起（唯小心谨慎才能做到），方可及时消弭；但如果失于觉察，以致发展到人人都能看出来的程度，那就无可挽回了。因此，罗马人总是提早就看出麻烦所在，决不为避免战争而让它们继续发展下去，他们知道，战争不可避免，拖延时日只能让他人得利。因此，他们抢先出手到希腊去打击腓力和安条克，以免将来不得不在意大利同他们作战。尽管当时罗马人可以避免这两场战争，但他们不想那么做，他们绝不会喜欢我们这个时代的聪明人整天挂在嘴边的口头禅：“时间会带来好处”，他们宁肯依靠自己的活力和精明。的确，时间能把一切事物推向前进，但它带来好处的时候也能带来坏处，而带来坏处的时候则能带来好处。