Chapter 3 Of Mixed Princedomspart3
But let us now go back toFrance and examine whether she has followed any of those methods of which Ihave made mention. I shall speak of Louis and not of Charles, because from theformer having held longer possession of Italy, his manner of acting is moreplainly seen. You will find, then, that he has done the direct opposite of whathe should have done in order to retain a foreign State.
King Louis was brought intoItaly by the ambition of the Venetians, who hoped by his coming to gain forthemselves a half of the State of Lombardy. I will not blame this coming, northe part taken by the King, because, desiring to gain a footing in Italy, wherehe had no friends, but on the contrary, owing to the conduct of Charles, everydoor was shut against him, he was driven to accept such friendships as he couldget. And his designs might easily have succeeded had he not made mistakes inother particulars of conduct.
By the recovery ofLombardy, Louis at once regained the credit which Charles had lost. Genoa madesubmission; the Florentines came to terms; the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke ofFerrara, the Bentivogli, the Countess of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro,Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, the citizens of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena, allcame forward offering their friendship. The Venetians, who to obtain possessionof a couple of towns in Lombardy had made the French King master of two-thirdsof Italy, had now cause to repent the rash game they had played.
Let any one, therefore,consider how easily King Louis might have maintained his authority in Italy hadhe observed the rules which I have noted above, and secured and protected allthose friends of his, who being weak, and fearful, some of the Church, some ofthe Venetians, were of necessity obliged to attach themselves to him, and withwhose assistance, for they were many, he might readily have made himself safeagainst any other powerful State. But no sooner was he in Milan than he took acontrary course, in helping Pope Alexander to occupy Romagna; not perceivingthat in seconding this enterprise he weakened himself by alienating friends andthose who had thrown themselves into his arms, while he strengthened the Churchby adding great temporal power to the spiritual power which of itself confersso mighty an authority. Making this first mistake, he was forced to follow itup, until at last, in order to curb the ambition of Pope Alexander, and preventhim becoming master of Tuscany, he was obliged to come himself into Italy.
And as though it were notenough for him to have aggrandized the Church and stripped himself of friends,he must needs in his desire to possess the Kingdom of Naples, divide it withthe King of Spain; thus bringing into Italy, where before he had been supreme,a rival to whom the ambitious and discontented in that Province might haverecourse. And whereas he might have left in Naples a King willing to hold ashis tributary, he displaced him to make way for another strong enough to effecthis expulsion.
The wish to acquire is nodoubt a natural and common sentiment, and when men attempt things within theirpower, they will always be praised rather than blamed. But when they persist inattempts that are beyond their power, mishaps and blame ensue. If France,therefore, with her own forces could have attacked Naples, she should have doneso. If she could not, she ought not to have divided it. And if her partition ofLombardy with the Venetians may be excused as the means whereby a footing wasgained in Italy, this other partition is to be condemned as not justified bythe like necessity.
Louis, then, had made thesefive blunders. He had destroyed weaker States, he had strengthened a Princealready strong, he had brought into the country a very powerful stranger, hehad not come to reside, and he had not sent colonies. And yet all theseblunders might not have proved disastrous to him while he lived, had he notadded to them a sixth in depriving the Venetians of their dominions. For had heneither aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it might havebeen at once reasonable and necessary to humble the Venetians; but aftercommitting himself to these other courses, he should never have consented tothe ruin of Venice. For while the Venetians were powerful they would alwayshave kept others back from an attempt on Lombardy, as well because they neverwould have agreed to that enterprise on any terms save of themselves being madeits masters, as because others would never have desired to take it from Francein order to hand it over to them, nor would ever have ventured to defy both.And if it be said that King Louis ceded Romagna to Alexander, and Naples toSpain in order to avoid war, I answer that for the reasons already given, youought never to suffer your designs to be crossed in order to avoid war, sincewar is not so to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And ifothers should allege the King’s promise to the Pope to undertake thatenterprise on his behalf, in return for the dissolution of his marriage, andfor the Cardinal’s hat conferred on d’Amboise, I answer by referring to what I say further on concerningthe faith of Princes and how it is to be kept.
King Louis, therefore, lostLombardy from not following any one of the methods pursued by others who havetaken Provinces with the resolve to keep them. Nor is this anything strange,but only what might reasonably and naturally be looked for. And on this verysubject I spoke to d’Amboise at Nantes, at the time when DukeValentino, as Cesare Borgia, son to Pope Alexander, was vulgarly called, wasoccupying Romagna. For, on the Cardinal saying to me that the Italians did notunderstand war, I answered that the French did not understand statecraft, forhad they done so, they never would have allowed the Church to grow so powerful.And the event shows that the aggrandizement of the Church and of Spain in Italyhas been brought about by France, and that the ruin of France has been wroughtby them. Whence we may draw the general axiom, which never or rarely errs, thathe who is the cause of another’s greatness is himselfundone, since he must work either by address or force, each of which excitesdistrust in the person raised to power.
现在回过头来看看法国,看她在上述诸方面都做了些什么。我只想谈谈路易而不谈查理 [5] ,因为前者统治意大利的时间较长,他的活动更能说明问题。你会看到,他在一个与本国大不相同的地区保持统治的所作所为,与他应当表现出来的作为,恰恰南辕而北辙。
路易国王是被威尼斯人的野心引入意大利的,他们企图通过他的干预而控制半个伦巴第。我不想非难法王作出的这个决定,因为他想在意大利立足,但在这个地方又没有盟友——查理国王实行过的政策使路易到处碰壁——于是他不得不接受所能够得到的盟友。假如没有其他措置失当之处,他的这个决定当能如愿以偿。
由于占领伦巴第,这位国王使法国再次赢得曾被查理丧失的威名:热那亚投降了;佛罗伦萨成了他的朋友;曼图亚 [6] 侯爵、费拉拉公爵、本蒂沃利 [7] 、弗利夫人 [8] ,以及法恩扎、佩萨罗、里米尼、卡梅里诺、皮翁比诺等地的领主,还有卢卡人、比萨人和锡耶纳人,统统跑来阿谀逢迎、争相趋附。到了这时,威尼斯人才发现自己的决定是多么轻率:为了获得伦巴第的两个城镇,却使这位法国国王成了意大利三分之二领土的主子。
如此看来,只要法王遵守前述规则,善待所有朋友,给他们以安全保护,他要保持在意大利的统治,当不会有什么困难。他们虽然为数众多,可是既弱小又胆怯,有的害怕教廷,有的害怕威尼斯人,因而总会乐意支持他;依靠他们的支持,他就能轻而易举地对付任何仍然强大的势力。但是,他进入米兰之后却反其道而行之,帮助教皇亚历山大 [9] 占据了罗马涅。他竟然没有认识到,这项决策将会使他失去朋友和投靠他的人们,从而削弱自己的力量;同时,本来就拥有巨大影响的教权又获得了如此非同小可的世俗权力,教廷的势力却大增。法王犯了头一个错误之后,便不得不继续错下去,以至于为了结束亚历山大的野心,制止他成为托斯卡纳的统治者,而不得不亲自跑到意大利去。
仿佛助长了教廷势力和丢掉了朋友还嫌不够,他又和西班牙国王 [10] 瓜分了他所垂涎的那不勒斯王国;本来,他是意大利的主宰,现在却带来一个同侪,于是,这个地方的野心家和对他心怀不满的人就有了回旋余地;本来,他可以在这个王国安排一个称臣纳贡之王,但他却把此人赶走而带来另一个人——一个能够把他赶走的人。
老实说,征服的欲望是很自然的人之常情,只要能做得到,总会受到颂扬而不是非难。不过,倘力不能及却又一意孤行,就会铸成大错而留下骂名。因此,那位法王如能依靠自己的力量进攻那不勒斯,他尽可以那么去做;如果没有足够的力量,他就不该去瓜分这个王国。如果说,为了在意大利立足而伙同威尼斯人瓜分伦巴第还值得称道,这又一次声名狼藉的瓜分就没有值得辩解的理由了。
到此为止,路易已经犯下了五个错误:摧残弱小势力,助长了意大利本已强大的一股势力,把一个外国强人引进这个国家,不去亲自驻扎,也不派遣殖民。毕其一生,假如他没有犯下第六个错误,即削弱威尼斯人的统治,上述五个错误还不至于对他产生危害。假如不去助长教廷的势力,不把西班牙人引进意大利,他就有理由也有必要降服威尼斯;既然他已经采取了先前采取的做法,他也决不应该同意灭亡威尼斯。只要威尼斯还保持着足够强大的力量,它是不会让西班牙和教廷来觊觎伦巴第的;这有两个原因:一则,威尼斯人除了自己去做伦巴第的主子之外,不可能让别人来打这个主意;二则,西班牙人和教皇断不会从法国手中夺回伦巴第之后再把它送给威尼斯;而且,它们谁也不敢同时攻击法国和威尼斯。有人可能会说,路易国王为了避免战争而把罗马涅让给了教皇亚历山大,把那不勒斯王国让给了西班牙。根据前面说过的理由,我的看法是,绝不能为了避免战争而容许养痈成患,因为战争无法逃避,拖延时日则会陷自己于不利。还有人会说,这位国王答应帮助教皇扩张势力是有交换条件的,即解除国王的婚姻关系和任命罗阿诺为枢机主教 [11] 。对此,我将在后面论及君主的信义和他们应当如何守信时再来作答。
实际上,路易国王正是由于未能遵守那些攻城略地之后还想保持不坠的人们所应当遵守的规则,这才丧失了伦巴第,因而并非不可思议,应该说很正常,并且理所当然。关于这个问题,在瓦伦蒂诺(教皇亚历山大之子,俗称切萨雷·博尔贾)攻占罗马涅之后,我曾在南特与罗阿诺谈论过。罗阿诺枢机主教对我说,意大利人不懂战争;对此我答道,法国人不懂政治,因为,只要他们还懂点政治,就不会让教廷如此扩张势力。经验表明,教廷在意大利和西班牙的扩张是法国国王促成的,而后者的败亡则是前者促成的。由此可以得出一个绝不会出错或者极少出错的普遍规律:谁促成他人壮大,谁就会自取灭亡,因为,他是用智谋或实力促成了他人的壮大,而壮大了的他人对这两点都会感到坐立不安。
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