02-Chapter 2 Of Hereditary Princedoms-mt

Chapter 2 Of HereditaryPrincedoms

Of Republics I shall notnow speak, having elsewhere spoken of them at length. Here I shall treatexclusively of Princedoms, and, filling in the outline above traced out, shallproceed to examine how such States are to be governed and maintained.

I say, then, thathereditary States, accustomed to the family of their Prince, are maintained withfar less difficulty than new States, since all that is required is that thePrince shall not depart from the usages of his ancestors, trusting for the restto deal with events as they arise. So that if an hereditary Prince be ofaverage address, he will always maintain himself in his Princedom, unlessdeprived of it by some extraordinary and irresistible force; and even if sodeprived will recover it, should any, even the least, mishap overtake theusurper.

We have in Italy an exampleof this in the Duke of Ferrara, who never could have withstood the attacks ofthe Venetians in 1484, nor those of Pope Julius in 1510, had not his authorityin that State been consolidated by time. For since a Prince by birth has feweroccasions and less need to give offence, he ought to be better loved, and willnaturally be popular with his subjects unless outrageous vices make him odious.Moreover, the very antiquity and continuance of his rule will efface thememories and causes which lead to innovation. For one change always leaves adovetail into which another will fit.

关于共和国的问题我将略而不谈，因为我在别处已有详论。我想专门关注一下君主国，按照上文所安排的顺序，探讨一下如何才能对这些君主国进行治理并使之保持不坠。

我认为，已经习惯于君主家族治理的世袭制国家，保持个人统治的困难要比新生君主国小得多，君主只要不去妄改祖制，遇事顺其自然，这就足矣。因此，这样一位君主只要稍加小心，总能维持他的统治，除非他被某种异常强大的力量篡夺了权力，而即使他遭到篡夺，一旦篡权者遭到厄运的打击，君主的权力仍会失而复得。

我们在意大利就能看到费拉拉公爵 [1] 这样的范例，他在1484年击退了威尼斯人的进犯，又在1510年击退了教皇尤利乌斯 [2] 的进犯，其原因无非是他在那块领地上的统治已经根深蒂固。和一个新生的统治者相比，世袭君主得罪人民的理由和必要性都比较少，因此必然会更受爱戴；如果他没有因为作恶多端而遭到憎恨，人民自然会心向往之，这是情理之中的事。而且，这种君权也会由于源远流长而湮没对激进变革及其原因的回忆，因为一次变革总会留下某些催生下一次变革的引子。