4、Their Finest Hour(他们最光辉的时刻) - 丘吉尔

June 18, 1940
Winston Churchill "Their Finest Hour"
House of Commons


I spoke the other day of the colossal military disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium at the moment when they knew that the French front was decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse. This delay entailed the loss of fifteen or sixteen French divisions and threw out of action for the critical period the whole of the British Expeditionary Force. Our Army and 120,000 French troops were indeed rescued by the British Navy from Dunkirk but only with the loss of their cannon, vehicles and modern equipment. This loss inevitably took some weeks to repair, and in the first two of those weeks the battle in France has been lost. When we consider the heroic resistance made by the French Army against heavy odds in this battle, the enormous losses inflicted upon the enemy and the evident exhaustion of the enemy, it may well be the thought that these 25 divisions of the best-trained and best-equipped troops might have turned the scale. However, General Weygand had to fight without them. Only three British divisions or their equivalent were able to stand in the line with their French comrades. They have suffered severely, but they have fought well. We sent every man we could to France as fast as we could re-equip and transport their formations.


I am not reciting these facts for the purpose of recrimination. That I judge to be utterly futile and even harmful. We cannot afford it. I recite them in order to explain why it was we did not have, as we could have had, between twelve and fourteen British divisions fighting in the line in this great battle instead of only three. Now I put all this aside. I put it on the shelf, from which the historians, when they have time, will select their documents to tell their stories. We have to think of the future and not of the past. This also applies in a small way to our own affairs at home. There are many who would hold an inquest in the House of Commons on the conduct of the Governments-and of Parliaments, for they are in it, too-during the years which led up to this catastrophe. They seek to indict those who were responsible for the guidance of our affairs. This also would be a foolish and pernicious process. There are too many in it. Let each man search his conscience and search his speeches. I frequently search mine.


Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future. Therefore, I cannot accept the drawing of any distinctions between Members of the present Government. It was formed at a moment of crisis in order to unite all the Parties and all sections of opinion. It has received the almost unanimous support of both Houses of Parliament. Its Members are going to stand together, and, subject to the authority of the House of Commons, we are going to govern the country and fight the war. It is absolutely necessary at a time like this that every Minister who tries each day to do his duty shall be respected; and their subordinates must know that their chiefs are not threatened men, men who are here today and gone tomorrow, but that their directions must be punctually and faithfully obeyed. Without this concentrated power we cannot face what lies before us. I should not think it would be very advantageous for the House to prolong this Debate this afternoon under conditions of public stress. Many facts are not clear that will be clear in a short time. We are to have a secret Session on Thursday, and I should think that would be a better opportunity for the many earnest expressions of opinion which Members will desire to make and for the House to discuss vital matters without having everything read the next morning by our dangerous foes.


The disastrous military events which have happened during the past fortnight have not come to me with any sense of surprise. Indeed, I indicated a fortnight ago as clearly as I could to the House that the worst possibilities were open; and I made it perfectly clear then that whatever happened in France would make no difference to the resolve of Britain and the British Empire to fight on, '~f necessary for years, if necessary alone." During the last few days we have successfully brought off the great majority of the troops we had on the line of communication in France; and seven-eighths of the troops we have sent to France since the beginning of the war-that is to say, about 350,000 out of 400,000 men-are safely back in this country. Others are still fighting with the French, and fighting with considerable success in their local encounters against the enemy. We have also brought back a great mass of stores, rifles and munitions of all kinds which had been accumulated in France during the last nine months.


We have, therefore, in this Island today a very large and powerful military force. This force comprises all our best-trained and our finest troops, including scores of thousands of those who have already measured their quality against the Germans and found themselves at no disadvantage. We have under arms at the present time in this Island over a million and a quarter men. Behind these we have the Local Defense Volunteers, numbering half a million, only a portion of whom, however, are yet armed with rifles or other firearms. We have incorporated into our Defense Forces every man for whom we have a weapon. We expect very large additions to our weapons in the near future, and in preparation for this we intend forthwith to call up, drill and train further large numbers. Those who are not called up, or else are employed during the vast business of munitions production in all its branches-and their ramifications are innumerable-will serve their country best by remaining at their ordinary work until they receive their summons. We have also over here Dominions armies. The Canadians had actually landed in France, but have now been safely withdrawn, much disappointed, but in perfect order, with all their artillery and equipment. And these very high-class forces from the Dominions will now take part in the defense of the Mother Country.


Lest the account which I have given of these large forces should raise the question: Why did they not take part in the great battle in France? I must make it clear that, apart from the divisions training and organizing at home, only 12 divisions were equipped to fight upon a scale which justified their being sent abroad. And this was fully up to the number which the French had been led to expect would be available in France at the ninth month of the war. The rest of our forces at home have a fighting value for home defense which will, of course, steadily increase every week that passes. Thus, the invasion of Great Britain would at this time require the transportation across the sea of hostile armies on a very large scale, and after they had been so transported they would have to be continually maintained with all the masses of munitions and supplies which are required for continuous battle-as continuous battle it will surely be.


Here is where we come to the Navy-and after all, we have a Navy. Some people seem to forget that we have a Navy. We must remind them. For the last thirty years I have been concerned in discussions about the possibilities of oversea invasion, and I took the responsibility on behalf of the Admiralty, at the beginning of the last war, of allowing all regular troops to be sent out of the country. That was a very serious step to take, because our Territorials had only just been called up and were quite untrained. Therefore, this Island was for several months particularly denuded of fighting troops. The Admiralty had confidence at that time in their ability to prevent a mass invasion even though at that time the Germans had a magnificent battle fleet in the proportion of 10 to 16, even though they were capable of fighting a general engagement every day and any day, whereas now they have only a couple of heavy ships worth speaking of-the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau. We are also told that the Italian Navy is to come out and gain sea superiority in these waters. If they seriously intend it, I shall only say that we shall be delighted to offer Signor Mussolini a free and safeguarded passage through the Strait of Gibraltar in order that he may play the part to which he aspires. There is a general curiosity in the British Fleet to find out whether the Italians are up to the level they were at in the last war or whether they have fallen off at all.


Therefore, it seems to me that as far as sea-borne invasion on a great scale is concerned, we are far more capable of meeting it today than we were at many periods in the last war and during the early months of this war, before our other troops were trained, and while the B.E.F. had proceeded abroad. Now, the Navy have never pretended to be able to prevent raids by bodies of 5,000 or 10,000 men flung suddenly across and thrown ashore at several points on the coast some dark night or foggy morning. The efficacy of sea power, especially under modern conditions, depends upon the invading force being of large size; It has to be of large size, in view of our military strength, to be of any use. If it is of large size, then the Navy have something they can find and meet and, as it were, bite on. Now, we must remember that even five divisions, however lightly equipped, would require 200 to 250 ships, and with modern air reconnaissance and photography it would not be easy to collect such an armada, marshal it, and conduct it across the sea without any powerful naval forces to escort it; and there would be very great possibilities, to put it mildly, that this armada would be intercepted long before it reached the coast, and all the men drowned in the sea or, at the worst blown to pieces with their equipment while they were trying to land. We also have a great system of minefields, recently strongly reinforced, through which we alone know the channels. If the enemy tries to sweep passages through these minefields, it will be the task of the Navy to destroy the mine-sweepers and any other forces employed to protect them. There should be no difficulty in this, owing to our great superiority at sea.


Those are the regular, well-tested, well-proved arguments on which we have relied during many years in peace and war. But the question is whether there are any new methods by which those solid assurances can be circumvented. Odd as it may seem, some attention has been given to this by the Admiralty, whose prime duty and responsibility is to destroy any large sea-borne expedition before it reaches, or at the moment when it reaches, these shores. It would not be a good thing for me to go into details of this. It might suggest ideas to other people which they have not thought of, and they would not be likely to give us any of their ideas in exchange. All I will say is that untiring vigilance and mind-searching must be devoted to the subject, because the enemy is crafty and cunning and full of novel treacheries and stratagems. The House may be assured that the utmost ingenuity is being displayed and imagination is being evoked from large numbers of competent officers, well-trained in tactics and thoroughly up to date, to measure and counterwork novel possibilities. Untiring vigilance and untiring searching of the mind is being, and must be, devoted to the subject, because, remember, the enemy is crafty and there is no dirty trick he will not do.


Some people will ask why, then, was it that the British Navy was not able to prevent the movement of a large army from Germany into Norway across the Skagerrak? But the conditions in the Channel and in the North Sea are in no way like those which prevail in the Skagerrak. In the Skagerrak, because of the distance, we could give no air support to our surface ships, and consequently, lying as we did close to the enemy's main air power, we were compelled to use only our submarines. We could not enforce the decisive blockade or interruption which is possible from surface vessels. Our submarines took a heavy toll but could not, by themselves, prevent the invasion of Norway. In the Channel and in the North Sea, on the other hand, our superior naval surface forces, aided by our submarines, will operate with close and effective air assistance


This brings me, naturally, to the great question of invasion from the air, and of the impending struggle between the British and German Air Forces. It seems quite clear that no invasion on a scale beyond the capacity of our land forces to crush speedily is likely to take place from the air until our Air Force has been definitely overpowered. In the meantime, there may be raids by parachute troops and attempted descents of airborne soldiers. We should be able to give those gentry a warm reception both in the air and on the ground, if they reach it in any condition to continue the dispute. But the great question is: Can we break Hitler's air weapon? Now, of course, it is a very great pity that we have not got an Air Force at least equal to that of the most powerful enemy within striking distance of these shores. But we have a very powerful Air Force which has proved itself far superior in quality, both in men and in many types of machine, to what we have met so far in the numerous and fierce air battles which have been fought with the Germans. In France, where we were at a considerable disadvantage and lost many machines on the ground when they were standing round the aerodromes, we were accustomed to inflict in the air losses of as much as two and two-and-a-half to one. In the fighting over Dunkirk, which was a sort of no-man's-land, we undoubtedly beat the German Air Force, and gained the mastery of the local air, inflicting here a loss of three or four to one day after day. Anyone who looks at the photographs which were published a week or so ago of the re-embarkation, showing the masses of troops assembled on the beach and forming an ideal target for hours at a time, must realize that this re-embarkation would not have been possible unless the enemy had resigned all hope of recovering air superiority at that time and at that place.


In the defense of this Island the advantages to the defenders will be much greater than they were in the fighting around Dunkirk. We hope to improve on the rate of three or four to one which was realized at Dunkirk; and in addition all our injured machines and their crews which get down safely-and, surprisingly, a very great many injured machines and men do get down safely in modern air fighting-all of these will fall, in an attack upon these Islands, on friendly. soil and live to fight another day; whereas all the injured enemy machines and their complements will be total losses as far as the war is concerned.


During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and continuous aid to. the French Army, both by fighters and bombers; but in spite of every kind of pressure we never would allow the entire metropolitan fighter strength of the Air Force to be consumed. This decision was painful, but it was also right, because the fortunes of the battle in France could not have been decisively affected even if we had thrown in our entire fighter force. That battle was lost by the unfortunate strategical opening, by the extraordinary and unforseen power of the armored columns, and by the great preponderance of the German Army in numbers. Our fighter Air Force might easily have been exhausted as a mere accident in that great struggle, and then we should have found ourselves at the present time in a very serious plight. But as it is, I am happy to inform the House that our fighter strength is stronger at the present time relatively to the Germans, who have suffered terrible losses, than it has ever been; and consequently we believe ourselves possessed of the capacity to continue the war in the air under better conditions than we have ever experienced before. I look forward confidently to the exploits of our fighter pilots-these splendid men, this brilliant youth-who will have the glory of saving their native land, their island home, and all they love, from the most deadly of all attacks.


There remains, of course, the danger of bombing attacks, which will certainly be made very soon upon us by the bomber forces of the enemy. It is true that the German bomber force is superior in numbers to ours; but we have a very large bomber force also, which we shall use to strike at military targets in Germany without intermission. I do not at all underrate the severity of the ordeal which lies before us; but I believe our countrymen will show themselves capable of standing up to it, like the brave men of Barcelona, and will be able to stand up to it, and carry on in spite of it, at least as well as any other people in the world. Much will depend upon this; every man and every woman will have the chance to show the finest qualities of their race, and render the highest service to their cause. For all of us, at this time, whatever our sphere, our station, our occupation or our duties, it will be a help to remember the famous lines: He nothing common did or mean, Upon that memorable scene.


I have thought it right upon this occasion to give the House and the country some indication of the solid, practical grounds upon which we base our inflexible resolve to continue the war. There are a good many people who say, "Never mind. Win or lose, sink or swim, better die than submit to tyranny-and such a tyranny." And I do not dissociate myself from them. But I can assure them that our professional advisers of the three Services unitedly advise that we should carry on the war, and that there are good and reasonable hopes of final victory. We have fully informed and consulted all the self-governing Dominions, these great communities far beyond the oceans who have been built up on our laws and on our civilization, and who are absolutely free to choose their course, but are absolutely devoted to the ancient Motherland, and who feel themselves inspired by the same emotions which lead me to stake our all upon duty and honor. We have fully consulted them, and I have received from their Prime Ministers, Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada, Mr. Menzies of Australia, Mr. Fraser of New Zealand, and General Smuts of South Africa-that wonderful man, with his immense profound mind, and his eye watching from a distance the whole panorama of European affairs-I have received from all these eminent men, who all have Governments behind them elected on wide franchises, who are all there because they represent the will of their people, messages couched in the most moving terms in which they endorse our decision to fight on, and declare themselves ready to share our fortunes and to persevere to the end. That is what we are going to do.


We may now ask ourselves: In what way has our position worsened since the beginning of the war? It has worsened by the fact that the Germans have conquered a large part of the coast line of Western Europe, and many small countries have been overrun by them. This aggravates the possibilities of air attack and adds to our naval preoccupations. It in no way diminishes, but on the contrary definitely increases, the power of our long-distance blockade. Similarly, the entrance of Italy into the war increases the power of our long-distance blockade. We have stopped the worst leak by that. We do not know whether military resistance will come to an end in France or not, but should it do so, then of course the Germans will be able to concentrate their forces, both military and industrial, upon us. But for the reasons I have given to the House these will not be found so easy to apply. If invasion has become more imminent, as no doubt it has, we, being relieved from the task of maintaining a large army in France, have far larger and more efficient forces to meet it.


If Hitler can bring under his despotic control the industries of the countries he has conquered, this will add greatly to his already vast armament output. On the other hand, this will not happen immediately, and we are now assured of immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of all kinds from the United States; and especially of aeroplanes and pilots from the Dominions and across the oceans coming from regions which are beyond the reach of enemy bombers.


I do not see how any of these factors can operate to our detriment on balance before the winter comes; and the winter will impose a strain upon the Nazi regime, with almost all Europe writhing and starving under its cruel heel, which, for all their ruthlessness, will run them very hard. We must not forget that from the moment when we declared war on the 3rd September it was always possible for Germany to turn all her Air Force upon this country, together with any other devices of invasion she might conceive, and that France could have done little or nothing to prevent her doing so. We have, therefore, lived under this danger, in principle and in a slightly modified form, during all these m6nths. In the meanwhile, however, we have enormously improved our methods of defense, and we have learned what we had no right to assume at the beginning, namely, that the individual aircraft and the individual British pilot have a sure and definite superiority. Therefore, in casting up this dread balancesheet and contemplating our dangers with a disillusioned eye, I see great reason for intense vigilance and exertion, but none whatever for panic or despair.


During the first four years of the last war the Allies experienced nothing but disaster and disappointment. That was our constant fear: one blow after another, terrible losses, frightful dangers. Everything miscarried. And yet at the end of those four years the morale of the Allies was higher than that of the Germans, who had moved from one aggressive triumph to another, and who stood everywhere triumphant invaders of the lands into which they had broken. During that war we repeatedly asked ourselves the question: How are we going to win? and no one was able ever to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly, quite unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us, and we were so glutted with victory that in our folly we threw it away.


We do not yet know what will happen in France or whether the French resistance will be prolonged, both in France and in the French Empire overseas. The French Government will be throwing away great opportunities and casting adrift their future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their Treaty obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them. The House will have read the historic declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen-and of our own hearts-we have proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in French history to conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle. However matters may go in France or with the French Government, or other French Governments, we in this Island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people. If we are now called upon to endure what they have been suffering, we shall emulate their courage, and if final victory rewards our toils they shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all. We abate nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do we recede. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined their causes to our own. All these shall be restored.


What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was their finest hour."


温斯顿·丘吉尔


“他们最光辉的时刻”


1940年6月18日


　　前些时我曾经谈到这场非常的军事灾难：法军最高统帅部在获悉法国前线在色当和马斯河一线肯定已经被突破时，没有能及时将北面的部队从比利时撤出。


　　这一延误使法军丧失了十五六个师，而且使整个英国远征军完全失去作用。


　　我们的陆军诚然被海军从敦刻尔克营救出来，但已经损失了全部的大炮、车辆和其他现代化装备。这些损失不得不花好几个星期去休整。然而休整刚刚开始两个星期，法国就溃败了。


　　这一切现在都不必多谈了，不妨束之高阁，待历史学家们去翻档案讲故事吧。我们要思考的是将来而不是过去。


　　有不少人希望进行一次调查，查一查在把我们导向这场悲剧的这些年里政府和国会的所作所为。他们希望起诉那些对国务负有领导责任的人。


　　这也是一种愚蠢有害的做法。涉及的人太多了。让每个人去扪心自问，去反省一下自己的言论吧，就像我经常反省自己那样。我敢肯定，如果我们在过去和现在之间展开一场争吵，我们日后会发现，我们已经失去了将来。


　　过去两个星期里法国发生的军事情况并未使我感到吃惊。其实两星期以前我已经尽可能清楚地向下院说明，最坏的可能性已见端倪。我说得非常明确，无论法国出现什么情况，决不会影响英国和英帝国继续作战，必要时可以长期作战，必要时也可以单独作战。


　　眼下，本岛有125万部队处于战备状态。此外还有地方防卫志愿军50万，不过他们之中只有一部分装备有步枪或其他火器。


　　我们的国防部队已经集中了大量的武器，不久的将来还有望获得极大量的补充。我们正在准备立即再征集、训练大量兵员。


　　我们这里还有各自治领的部队。加拿大部队其实已在法国登陆，他们大失所望，不过现在已经安全地携带全部大炮和装备撤到我们这里。这些从自治领来的高水平的部队将参加保卫他们的母国。


　　因此，现在想侵犯大不列颠，敌军就必须极大规模地越海运输部队，而部队运输之后又必须持续供应持久战所必需的大量军火和给养，因为战争必将是持久的。


　　现在该谈谈海军了。毕竟我们还有一支海军，有些人似乎忘了，我们必须提醒他们。30多年来我一直关注着关于海上入侵的可能性的讨论。上次大战开始时我曾代表海军部负责运送所有的正规部队出国，虽然那时我们的本土防卫队刚刚征集，尚待考验。


　　我觉得，就海上大规模入侵的问题而言，比起上次大战中很多时候以及这次大战中头几个月我们的部队未及训练而英国远征军又在国外的情况来，我们现在对付他们的能力要强得多。


　　我们还有一个大面积的水雷区，最近它又得到了加强。只有我们自己知道水雷区的航道。如果敌人试图在水雷区清扫出一条航道，我们海军的任务就是摧毁他们的扫雷舰以及为扫雷舰护航的其他部队。由于我们的海上优势，这一点应该是没有困难的。


　　有些人会问，为什么英国海军没能阻止一支大部队从德国越过斯卡格拉克海峡进入挪威？应该说，英吉利海峡及北海的情况和斯卡格拉克海峡普遍存在的情况是完全不同的。在斯卡格拉克海峡，由于距离太远。我们无法为水面舰船提供空中支援，其结果是，为了避开敌军在挪威海面的空军主力，我们只好被迫使用潜艇。


　　这就自然而然地引出空中入侵和即将到来的英德空军之间较量的大问题。


　　事情似乎很清楚，在我们空军的实力决定性地被压倒之前，规模大到我们的地面部队无力迅速予以粉碎的空中入侵是不大会发生的。但同时降落伞部队的突然袭击或空降兵的试图降落倒是可能的。我们应该能给这些家伙以热情的接待，无论在空中或者在他们落地并继续顽抗的时候。


　　眼前，非常遗憾的当然是我们至少还没有一支可以在我国海岸地带与最强大的敌方空军相匹敌的空军，但是我们毕竟还是有一支强大的空军，在人员和多种机型这两方面的质量上远优于他们遭遇的对手，这一点已在迄今为止多次的空中恶战中得到证明。


　　此外，还有轰炸的危险。敌人的轰炸机部队肯定很快就会轰炸我们。千真万确，这些轰炸机部队在数量上是超过我们的。不过我们也有一支强大的轰炸机部队，我们将用以不间歇地打击德国的军事目标。


　　我丝毫也没有低估我们面临的考验的严峻性，但是我相信我们的同胞们会证明他们能顶得住并且百折不回地坚持下去，至少不输给世界上任何民族。


　　一切取决于自己，每一个男人和女人都有机会显示自己民族的优秀品质，为自己的事业作出最大的贡献。


　　对我们大家来说，无论什么身份、什么地位，记得这两行有名的诗总是有益的：


　　对那令人怀念的事业，他作出了卓越的贡献。


　　我想应该在这个场合向下院和全国说明，我们无比坚定的继续作战的决心是有着坚实基础的。我敢向他们保证，我们三军的参谋们一致认为我们应该打下去，我们有充分的、合理的取得最后胜利的希望。


　　我们已经把一切告知所有的自治领，我们已经收到各位总理用最感人的言辞表达的信息，他们支持我们的决定，宣布他们已经准备好和我们共命运，并坚持到底。


　　现在我们可以自问，战争爆发以来我们的处境是如何每况愈下的？！那是由于德国人征服了西欧协约国的大部分海岸，许多小国被侵占，这就加大了空中攻击的可能性，也增加了对我们海军的牵制。但我们的海军决没有被削弱，相反肯定是加强了我们远距离封锁的能力。


　　如果法国的军事抵抗告终——现在还没有，虽然不管怎么说是大大减弱了——德国人就能集中其军事力量和工业能力对付我们。不过按我向下院说过的理由，这决不是轻而易举的。


　　即便入侵迫在眉睫，我们也已经从在法国维持庞大部队的重担下摆脱出来，并已经有了强大得多的兵力在本土作战。


　　如果希特勒能把占领国的工业专横地控制起来，就将大大加强他原已庞大的军需生产。但这也决不是一朝一夕之功。而我们现在则有把握从美国得到大量持续不断而且越来越多的各种各样武器的支援，特别是飞机和飞行员。他们越洋而来，来自敌人的轰炸机鞭长莫及的地方。


　　总起来说，在冬天到来之前，我看不出这些因素能起多少对我们不利的作用。而冬天会给纳粹政权加重负担，半个欧洲在他们的铁蹄下挣扎、挨饿。不管他们何等凶残，这一切都将使他们陷于困境。


　　因此在计算这张令人忧虑的资产负债表，并且清醒地反复思考我们的危险时，我认为有千万条理由要竭尽全力和时刻警惕，但绝无丝毫理由惊慌失措，丧失信心。上次大战的头9个月，协约国遭遇的只有灾难和失望，但最后，他们的士气比德国人要高，尽管德国人在侵略中也曾经一再得逞。


　　在那次战争中，我们曾一再问自己：“我们将如何赢得胜利？”但始终没有谁能准确地作出答复。直到最后，凶恶的敌人突如其来、出人意料地在我们面前崩溃了。可惜我们被胜利冲昏头脑，以致干了蠢事，又把胜利的果实丢了。


　　我们还不知道法国会出现什么情况，法国人的抵抗还能不能在法国和她的海外帝国继续下去。法国政府如果不按照条约的义务继续打下去——我们认为还不能免除他们的这些义务——那么他们必将丧失大好时机，葬送他们的前途。


　　下院将会看到一个历史性的声明，按许多法国人和我们自己内心的愿望，我们宣布了愿意在法兰西历史上最黑暗的时刻和他们结成一个在共同斗争中互通国籍的同盟。


　　不论法国、法国现政府或者别的法国政府何去何从，我们英国和英帝国永远不会舍弃和法国人民的同志之谊。


　　如果现在要我们去承受他们所蒙受过的苦难，我们将会学习他们的勇敢。如果我们的艰辛赢得最后胜利，他们将分享胜利的果实——当然，大家都将重获自由。我们决不降低我们的正义要求，捷克人、波兰人、挪威人、荷兰人、比利时人，凡是把他们的事业和我们的事业融为一体的，都将重获自由。


　　魏刚将军所说的法兰西之战已告终结，不列颠之战即将揭幕。基督教文明的生死存亡在此一战。


　　我们英国人、我们的制度和我们的帝国的存亡续绝也都在此一战。敌人全部的凶狂和强暴很快就会转向我们。希特勒懂得，必须把我们粉碎在这个岛上，否则他就输了这场战争。


　　如果我们能顶得住，全欧洲都将获得解放，全世界的人民就能进入一个阳光普照的辽阔高地。但是，如果我们失败了，全世界，包括美国和所有我们熟悉和关怀的国家，都将堕入一个新的黑暗时代的深渊、一个由某种扭曲了的科学所造成的更加凶险或者可能更加漫长的黑暗时代的深渊。


　　那么就让我们振作精神，承担起自己的责任来，让我们干出名堂来——倘若英联邦和英帝国再生存一千年，到那时人们还会说“这是他们最光辉的时刻”。