【英文原声版51】Gil-li Vardi: On War

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Theories based on the Napoleonic wars

从拿破仑战争中发展出来的理论

Zachary Davis: It’s October of 1807, and Prussian soldier Carl von Clausewitz is being held in France as a prisoner of war along with 25,000 other Prussian soldiers. A year earlier, Napoleon Bonaparte and his army invaded Prussia, in what is today modern Germany, and defeated the Prussian-Saxon army. Napoleon was on a rampage across Europe and brought forth a completely new style of war that Clausewitz, unfortunately for him, witnessed first-hand.

扎克里·戴维斯：1807年10月，卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨和其他两万五千名普鲁士士兵成为了战俘，被关押在法国。一年前，拿破仑·波拿巴率领军队入侵了普鲁士，也就是如今的德国，击败了普鲁士的撒克逊军队。拿破仑在欧洲势如破竹，带来了全新的战争风格。不幸的是，克劳塞维茨亲眼目睹了这一风格。

Zachary Davis: Clausewitz eventually returned to Prussia and helped rebuild the Prussian army and state. Over the next ten years, he developed a theory of war based on what he experienced in the Napoleonic wars. This became his 1832 text On War.

扎克里·戴维斯：克劳塞维茨最终回到了普鲁士，帮助重建了普鲁士的军队和国家。在接下来的十年里，他基于自己在拿破仑战争中的经历，发展出了一套战争理论。这套理论在他1832年出版的《战争论》一书中得到了阐述。

Gil-li Vardi: And he thought he witnessed something, he witnessed war in its pure essence, and therefore wanted very much to take it from, you know, action to theory, take it back to theory to offer us a key to understanding this war. Ever since the book is published until this very day, it's a must read. You have to, if you want to become an officer, you will have to read Clausewitz.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：他觉得他目睹了一些东西，目睹了战争的纯粹本质，于是很想从实际经历中提炼出理论，为我们找到了解这场战争的不二法门。这本书从出版之日起到今天，都是一本不得不读的书。如果你想成为军官，那就必须要读一读克劳塞维茨。

Gil-li Vardi: So, my name is Gil-li Vardi. I'm a military historian, and I study modern armies and modern military organizations and wars.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：我叫吉尔·利·瓦尔迪，是一名军事历史学家。我研究的是现代军队、现代军事组织和战争。

Zachary Davis: On War has become something of a military bible. This book touched on several universal truths about war and how to fight it.

扎克里·戴维斯：《战争论》已经成了一本军事经典。这本书讲了几条关于战争以及如何打仗的普适性真理。

Gil-li Vardi: Clausewitz didn't want to offer us a recipe, but he offered us something else. He offered a general theory from which we can, you know, we can deduce what we should do when we're about to fight a war or if we want to fight a war.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：克劳塞维茨不想给我们一本军事秘籍，他给我们的是另一种东西。他提供了一条普适性的理论，你可以从中推测出，当我们要打、或想要打一场战争时应该怎么做。

Zachary Davis: Welcome to Writ Large, a podcast about how books change the world. I’m Zachary Davis. In each episode, I talk with one of the world’s leading scholars about one book that changed the course of history. For this episode, I sat down with Professor Gil-li Vardi to discuss Carl von Clausewitz’s On War.

扎卡里·戴维斯：欢迎收听：100本改变你和世界的书，在这里我们为大家讲述改变世界的书籍。我是扎卡里·戴维斯。每一集，我都会和一位世界顶尖学者探讨一本影响历史进程的书。在本集，我和吉尔·利·瓦尔迪教授一起讨克劳塞维茨的《战争论》。

Zachary Davis: Carl von Clausewitz was born in 1780 in the German state of Prussia, what is today north eastern Germany.

扎卡里·戴维斯：1780年，卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨出生在德意志的普鲁士王国，也就是如今的德国东北部。

Gil-li Vardi: He joined the army at a very early age, and he started climbing his way up and always exhibited interest in writing and in philosophy and the theory of war. He studied, you know, the great military minds of his time, and then he went to the Kriegsakademie, to the military academy.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：克劳塞维茨很早就参了军，职级也逐渐上升。他一直对写作、哲学和战争理论非常感兴趣，还研究了当时一些伟大的军事思想。后来，他去了柏林军事学院任职。

Zachary Davis: During his military studies, Clausewitz took an interest in philosophy which would later influence his theoretical writings on war.

扎卡里·戴维斯：在研究军事的过程中，克劳塞维茨对哲学产生了浓厚的兴趣。这影响了他后来关于战争的理论著作。

Gil-li Vardi: Clausewitz himself was very much affected. He was affected by Hegelian ideas. He's not attending, of course, he's not writing a Ph.D., but he is attending salons. And he's very much part of bigger conversations in Berlin and in the area, very well versed in such ideas. He had the chance to talk to a lot of people who are studying philosophers, who are writing philosophy. So, even though he's not officially trained in any of it, he has access to, you know, the most fashionable and discussed ideas around him.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：哲学也极大地影响了克劳塞维茨本人。他受到了黑格尔思想的影响。当然，他没有写关于哲学的博士论文，但他参加过相关的沙龙，也参与了柏林乃至这一整个地区在这方面的讨论，对这些思想非常了解。他有机会和很多研究哲学家、写哲学文章的人交流。所以，尽管他没受过任何科班的哲学训练，但他有机会接触到周围最流行的、最为热议的思想。

Zachary Davis: What did the beginnings of his war career look like?

扎克里·戴维斯：他的军事生涯是如何开启的？

Gil-li Vardi: So, Clausewitz himself is not only, of course, not only or mainly a theoretician, right? He fought wars. He fought against Napoleon. And it was this experience of fighting against Napoleon that led him, that set the foundations for, for his seminal book. What really shaped his military career and his philosophy is the Napoleonic Wars. And I would say that it shaped very much the lives of every European involved.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：克劳塞维茨绝不仅仅是理论家。他打过仗，还和拿破仑打过仗。正是这次与拿破仑大军交战的经历，为他这本开创性的著作奠定了基础。拿破仑战争真正地塑造了他的军事生涯和军事哲学，也改变了欧洲交战各国人们的生活。

Zachary Davis: Napoleon Bonaparte was a French military leader and emperor during the early 19th century. He got his start in the French Revolution. In the late 18th century, many French citizens were unsatisfied with their monarchical ruler, King Louis XVI. The French people revolted and fought a ten year revolution that eventually ended the monarchy. They fought for equality, freedom, and a more democratic society.

扎克里·戴维斯：拿破仑·波拿巴是19世纪初的法国军事领袖和皇帝。他在法国大革命中一步步崛起。18世纪末，许多法国公民不满于国王路易十六，揭竿而起，掀起了为期十年的革命，最终结束了君主制。这些法国公民为建立一个平等、自由和更民主的社会而战。

Zachary Davis: What were the Napoleonic Wars about?

扎克里·戴维斯：拿破仑战争的目的是什么？

Gil-li Vardi: Well, Napoleon fought for the revolution, okay? Early on. And, you know, meteorically rose to power. When he fights for the revolution, he fights in order to spread ideas about the revolution, but also because France is attacked. But the interesting bit is that he—France, representing certain ideas, the ideas of the French Revolution, is attacked by a coalition of Europeans, of European governments who are completely unhappy with these ideas.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：早期的时候，拿破仑为革命而战，成为了冉冉升起的政治之星。当他还是在为革命而战的时候，他打仗是为了传播革命思想，更是为了抵御法国所受的侵略。有意思的是，他和法国所代表的法国大革命的思想被欧洲的反法同盟猛烈抨击。这些国家对革命思想非常不满。

Zachary Davis: After the revolution, Napoleon rose to power and continued his conquest across Europe to stabilize and protect the French government. By aligning his goals with the goals of the people, Napoleon had tremendous support and plenty of willing soldiers in his army. This was a big difference between Napoleon’s army and the armies of kings throughout Europe.

扎克里·戴维斯：革命后，拿破仑上台，继续在欧洲各地征战，以巩固和保卫法国政权。拿破仑的目标与人民的目标一致，这让他在军队中获得了大力支持，也收获了大量自愿入伍的士兵。这是拿破仑的军队和其他欧洲王室军队的一大区别。

Gil-li Vardi: The French Revolution, as historians say, unleashed a genie out of a bottle. All of a sudden, war is everyone's business. You don't have to—If you're a European king, right, say if you're the Prussian king, who's going to join your army? No one, basically, unless you force them to. They don't want to fight for you. They have no interest in war. It's not their war. It's your war.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：法国大革命像是放出了壶中的精灵，带来了无法逆转的神奇效应。突然之间，战争成了每个人的事。如果你是欧洲的国王，比方说，如果你是普鲁士国王，谁会主动入伍呢？除非你强迫他们，否则基本上没人愿意。他们不想为你而战，对战争没有兴趣，因为这不是他们的战争，只是你一个人的战争。

Napoleon and the total war

拿破仑和全面战争

Zachary Davis: This dynamic influenced the way wars were typically fought before Napoleon.

扎克里·戴维斯：这种参战热情改变了之前典型的作战方式。

Gil-li Vardi: The armies of the time are very, you cannot exceed 90,000 men. Most of the political entities involved cannot fund any more than this. And they cannot force any more people to join the army. Mostly you can't get people to commit. They just don't want to do it. They have no reason to commit. They're not interested.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：之前的军队规模非常小，不超过九万人。大多数政府没法提供足够的资金来支持更多人参战，也没法强迫更多人入伍。大多数时候，你没法强迫人们为你效忠。他们就是不想，也没理由效忠于你，对此也不感兴趣。

Gil-li Vardi: If you imagine, you know, this kind of warfare, and what you will recall from all the movies that you've ever watched, you know, on this kind of war that the soldiers are standing together, exposed in the field. And the reason that they're standing together is that it’s because it’s easier for the commanders to see them and to force them to march forward.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：想象一下那时候的战争，回想一下看过的所有相关的电影，你会发现在这种战争中，士兵们会成群结队地出现在战场上。他们成群结队的原因，是因为这样指挥官更容易看见他们，也更容易命令他们往前冲。

Gil-li Vardi: Discipline will keep them standing there because it's worse to get caught if you're trying to run away. It's worse if you're, you know, if you're getting caught, you'll be disciplined and punished like you wouldn't believe it. It's really cruel. But Napoleon, on the other hand, his men, they want to be there. They want to fight for France. They're not fighting…Eventually, they'll fight for him, too. But they want to fight for France. And they are a part of France. They represent an idea. They're not forced to fight. They want to. And what you can get out of men who are there because they want to is far more than what you'll ever get out of men who are forced to.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：军规会让他们乖乖待在战场上，因为就算你当了逃兵，一旦被抓住，下场会更惨。按照军规，你会受到难以置信的残酷惩罚。但拿破仑的军队就不一样。他的士兵是真的想待在战场上，为法国而战。他们不是在为拿破仑一个人而战，虽然最后还是变成了为他一个人而战。但至少他们是想要为法国而战的，想要成为保卫法国的一份子。他们身上折射出了一种理念——他们不是被迫入伍的，而是自愿入伍的。而你从自愿入伍的人那儿得到的，要远胜过从被迫入伍的人那儿得到的。

Zachary Davis: Having a ready and willing army was just one part of the difference between the way Napoleon fought and the rest of Europe.

扎克里·戴维斯：拿破仑军队和欧洲其他国家军队作战的一大差别在于，拿破仑的士兵心甘情愿地准备着迎接战争。

Gil-li Vardi: These wars, really, you know, turned Europe upside down, unleashed many ideas, ideas that most of European leadership actually didn't like. And it also brought war to the people. Right? All of a sudden, a lot of people are involved in war because Clausewitz, he is, of course, he’s a soldier. But Napoleonic warfare was the beginning of what you and I might call “total war”. It wasn't total in any way, but that's the beginning of it.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：这些战争彻底改变了欧洲，催生出许多思想。而这些思想恰恰是许多欧洲君主所不喜欢的，而且也把战争带给了人民。突然之间，许多人都卷入了战争，这其中就有克劳塞维茨，当然他本身就是士兵。不过拿破仑战争揭开了我们所说的“全面战争”的序幕。它本身在任何方面都不全面，但它是全面战争的开端。

Zachary Davis: When a nation is involved in a total war, it utilizes all of a society’s resources, both military and civilian.

扎克里·戴维斯：当一个国家卷入一场全面战争时，它就会动用全社会的所有资源，包括军事和民用资源。

Gil-li Vardi: So, in order to have a total war, we need total means, total goals, and total mobilization. All of it started with the French Revolution, but it was still very much, still not total, because it's just the very beginning. Now, when Clausewitz is experiencing this, for him, it's a very, very traumatic and shocking experience, for him and for the, you know, men and women of his generation. It's a shocking experience. They just didn't know it can get so, oh, so much more. So much worse.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：为了发动一场全面战争，我们需要全面的手段、全面的目标和全面的动员。所有这些都是从法国大革命开始的，但法国大革命时的战争仍然不够全面，因为它仅仅是一个开端。而当克劳塞维茨目睹了这些，便觉得非常震撼。对他和他那一代人来说，这都是一个令人震撼的体验。他们不知道战争竟然可以如此大规模、造成如此多的破坏。

Zachary Davis: Because Napoleon had so many soldiers willing to fight and die for him, he was able to be more daring in his battles. Before this time, European war was a more conservative, less lethal effort. We now call that kind of fighting “limited war”.

扎卡里·戴维斯：拿破仑有这么多士兵愿意为他而战、为他而死，所以他能够在战争中更加大胆。在这之前，欧洲的战争相对保守、破坏性不那么大。如今我们把这种战争称为“有限战争”。

Gil-li Vardi: The reason it's less lethal is that armies are professional armies, and training and arming these soldiers is very expensive. So, you just don't want to commit them to battle all too often. You just don't offer battle or accept battle unless you're absolutely sure you're going to win. These are also very sort of structured and almost...well-performed events, right?

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：它们之所以破坏性相对较小，是因为这些军队都是职业化的。训练并武装这些士兵的成本非常高，所以你不想让他们经常作战。除非你确信你会赢，否则你不会开战或参战。所以这些战争也往往很有秩序、表现很好。

Gil-li Vardi: It's all about the geometry of people standing in lines and either attacking or performing very basic maneuvers. And it's all extremely limited. If you lose or win, it doesn't, you know, it's not going to change a whole lot for the kingdom or for the people or also for the, you know, absolute ruler.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：一个队伍的人们站成一排，要么进攻，要么执行一些基本的军事策略。这么做的影响也极其有限。不管是赢是输，都不会对王国、人民以及君主有太大的影响。

Zachary Davis: Now, part of what I think of with total war is civilians are newly vulnerable. How were civilians killed?

扎克里·戴维斯：全面战争使我想起的其中一点是，它会让平民更容易受到伤害。平民是如何被杀的呢？

Gil-li Vardi: The “wonderful” thing for Napoleon was that he actually didn't need to feed his army. You can send your, you can disperse them, right? You can send your soldiers to get their own food, that is to take it from civilians, right, and then come back, which is something, again, his enemies did not enjoy. They had to feed their own soldiers. Otherwise soldiers will leave. So, and again, we're talking about pre-industrial societies.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：拿破仑的“神奇”之处在于，他其实不需要给他的军队提供食物。你可以把他们派走，让士兵自己去获取食物，其实就是从平民那儿抢食物，再回来。这同样是他的敌人不乐意见到的事情。他的敌人们要喂饱自己的士兵，不然他们就会溜走。当然，再提醒一下，我们这儿说的是前工业社会的情况。

Gil-li Vardi: There's an extra amount of food. If soldiers are there, they're taking the food, and it means that the civilians will starve. So, civilians are hurt in many different ways, but it's mostly that food is prevented from them. And then there's a lot of looting, sacking, and also acts of, you know, brutal acts of murder.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：那儿有多余的食物。如果士兵过去了，就会把食物掠走，而平民就会挨饿。平民会经受着各种各样的伤害，最常见的就是食物被抢走。此外还有很多抢劫、偷盗、残忍谋杀的行为。

Gil-li Vardi: And I don't want to, you know, I don't want to suggest that this is something new, right? If you think of the Thirty Years War, there are definitely, you know, horrific scenes in some parts of Europe. So many civilians died. But this is the beginning, right? The rise of the national army is also the rise of, you know, for us to really think about the difference between citizens and soldiers.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：我不想说这是新出现的情况。比如在三十年战争期间，欧洲一些地方肯定也会有平民死亡的可怕情况。但这么多平民死亡，却还是从拿破仑战争开始的。国家军队的兴起也意味着这些可怕情况的兴起，这让我们开始思考公民与士兵之间的区别。

Ideas in the two iterations of the book

两版书中的理念

Zachary Davis: The Napoleonic wars had a significant impact on Clausewitz. By fighting with both the Prussian and Russian armies against Napoleon, Clausewitz got a firsthand experience of this new style of warfare. Towards the end of the wars, Clausewitz began to theorize about war based on what he had witnessed. These writings became On War.

扎克里·戴维斯：拿破仑战争极大地影响了克劳塞维茨。在和普鲁士军队、俄国军队抗击拿破仑大军的过程中，克劳塞维茨获得了关于这种新式战争的第一手经验。战争接近尾声时，克劳塞维茨开始根据他所目睹的情况，写了一些关于战争的理论。这些理论汇总成了《战争论》一书。

Gil-li Vardi: War will now touch and change the lives of more people. And so it's not only, of course, Clausewitz that is completely shaken by what he witnessed. Many Europeans wanted to understand, to unlock the secret right of the new form, of the new way of war. And this is what he did.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：战争现在会触及并改变更多人的生活。当然，被这一切彻底震撼到的不仅仅有克劳塞维茨，许多欧洲人都想要了解这种新的战争形式，揭开它的神秘面纱。而这恰恰就是克劳塞维茨所做的。

Gil-li Vardi: He is re-presenting, you know, the importance of the spirit and of the factors that are very difficult to theorize or to think about in a scientific way. And he wanted to explain how war is the product or very much shaped by such forces. And yet he is also offering us, despite his best efforts, offered us a theory, a general theory of war—how should we or how can we understand war, and in many ways, you know, how we should fight wars.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：他重述了一些东西的重要性。比如精神以及一些难以理论化或是用科学的方式去思考的因素。他想解释为什么战争是这些因素的产物，或是被这些因素所塑造。他还努力为我们提供了一套关于战争的普适性理论，告诉我们应当或可以如何理解战争、应当如何打仗。

Zachary Davis: What is the form of the book, and what are its main arguments?

扎克里·戴维斯：这本书的形式是怎样的？它的主要论点是什么？

Gil-li Vardi: War is this, at its very essence, the pure essence of war, you cannot control it. You know how you're going to start. You never know how it's going to end, right? It's based on his experience fighting Napoleon, fighting a war of the people to which the entire, whatever the nation has to offer, is indeed offered. Everything is mobilized. There are no limits, whatsoever to what you will, the kind of effort that the nation will put into it. And therefore, there is no limit to the war itself.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：战争的本质就是，你无法完全左右它。你知道你会怎么开始，但不知道会怎么结束。这一结论基于他对抗拿破仑大军的经验。拿破仑发动的是一场涉及全体人民的战争，所有战争中需要的东西都被调动起来了。没有任何限制，只要是你投入的，国家都会投入到战争中。所以战争本身是不受任何限制的。

Gil-li Vardi: And so, he's writing this, right? He's, you know, writing eight books within one with this idea. And if you follow this idea, if you read Clausewitz based on the idea of war as a force that is violent and you cannot control it, destructive, right, and you cannot control it, you read it the same way that most Westerners read it, all the way to, you know, ever since it was published in 1832 to 1945. This is a kind of war that in order to win it, you will need to amass huge national armies. And the armies, these armies will be tasked with the mission of annihilating each other.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：于是他写了这个想法，把它写进了这本囊括八篇内容的书。如果顺着这个思想，觉得战争是不可控的、富有破坏性的暴力活动，带着这个观点去阅读克劳塞维茨，那么你和1832年出版后到1945年之间大多数西方人的解读是一样的。在这种战争中，为了赢得战争，你需要集结强大的国家军队，而这些军队将肩负消灭敌军的使命。

Gil-li Vardi: If you want to win a war that is all about destruction, right, you will need to do it, the main way to do it, or almost the only way to do it is focus on the battle, right? You will need to initiate war and look for and accept battle. And battle, right, if you ask yourself, “What is battle?” Well, it's just mainly a competition of destruction. You'll put your, you know, a lot of your men in one place and you will face the enemy, and hopefully destroy the enemy.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：如果你想要、或是需要赢得一场以摧毁敌军为目的的战争，最主要、或是唯一的办法就是专注于战役。你要发起战役、寻找作战机会并参战。如果你问自己什么是战役，回答便是：它主要是一种破坏性的竞争。你要把你的很多兵放在一个地方，迎战敌军，幸运的话会消灭敌军。

Gil-li Vardi: So, if you read Clausewitz, the way the Clausewitz, you know, intended first, in the first iteration, you will almost necessarily end up fighting wars of, you know, massive, massive destruction and wars that will be total.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：如果读一读克劳塞维茨，你会发现他在第一版中的首要思想就是，你最后不可避免地会打那种具有大规模破坏性的全面战争。

Zachary Davis: When Clausewitz first wrote On War, his theories came from his most immediate experience fighting total wars against Napoleon. But he began to realize that if he wanted to find universal truths about war, he would need to look beyond his experiences in the Napoleonic wars.

扎克里·戴维斯：克劳塞维茨第一次写《战争论》时，他的理论基于与拿破仑打全面战争的一手经验。但他开始意识到，如果他想找到关于战争的普遍真理，就不能囿于这些经验。

Gil-li Vardi: If you look back at the history, you know, of wars, you don't see a lot of total wars. You don't see a lot of the Napoleonic style, you know, wars. What you're seeing is, in Clausewitz’s most immediate memory, you're seeing 18th century wars, which are mostly very, very, very limited. These are wars in which, you know, two small professional armies are dancing about, you know, around each other, and they're not doing a lot of killing.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：如果回顾一下战争历史，你不会看到很多全面战争，不会看到很多拿破仑式的战争。你会发现，在克劳塞维茨记得最清楚的18世纪的战争中，全面战争也很少。这些战争就像是两小支规模不大的职业军队在围绕着对方跳来跳去，没有进行大规模的杀戮。

Gil-li Vardi: And there's not a lot of destruction. And there's not a lot of victories, basically, or military decisions, right? You don't get a whole lot of that. This is why Napoleon is so very successful, because he forced decision by battle.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：它们也没有造成很多破坏，也没有很多军事胜利或军事决策。所有这些都不多。而这恰恰是拿破仑如此成功的原因，因为他通过战役迫使将士做出决策。

Zachary Davis: Clausewitz found that policy was an extremely powerful force that managed to limit wars. He began to see war as a political tool, as he writes in On War, "War is not merely a political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of the political process, an application by other means." He began to revise On War with a new stance.

扎克里·戴维斯：克劳塞维茨发现，政策是一种极其强大的力量，能够限制战争的进行。他开始把战争看作一种政治工具。正如他在《战争论》中写道：“战争不仅仅是一种政治行为，更是一种真正的政治工具，是政治以另一种手段在延续。”他开始怀着新的观点修改《战争论》。

Gil-li Vardi: And so Clausewitz had to admit that policy is more powerful, and, indeed, war must abide by, must serve policy. You were fighting in order to achieve some political end, and any kind of limitation, right, any kind of limit to the war effort comes from that political rationale. And when you ask people today, “What is Clausewitz saying about war? What is the definition of war?” They say, “Oh, war is simply a continuation of policy by other means.”

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：克劳塞维茨不得不承认，政策的力量更大，战争其实必须遵守并服务于政策。你是为了实现某种政治目的而战，任何一种对战争行动的制约都源于这个政治理由。如今你问大家：“克劳塞维茨对战争的看法是什么？战争的定义是什么？”他们会说：“战争只是政策以其他手段的延续。”

Gil-li Vardi: But if this is your take on Clausewitz, right, how you imagine war is very, very different. War is not a total thing of complete mass chaos and violence and destruction. No, it must be guided by some sort of political rationale. “I don't want to completely destroy the enemy. I actually just want to win a battle or to achieve a very limited goal. I don't need to kill pretty much everyone.”

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：但如果这就是你对克劳塞维茨的理解，那么你把战争想得非常不一样。战争并不是一个完全会带来大规模混乱、暴力与破坏的东西，它必须被某种政治理由所引导。你会觉得：“我不想彻底消灭敌人，只是想打赢一场战役，或是实现一个非常有限的目标。我不需要杀死几乎所有人。”

Gil-li Vardi: The problem is, of course, that Clausewitz managed to change Book One and Book Eight, and then he died. and so we're left with two very different, conflicting ideas about what is war and how to fight it.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：当然问题是，克劳塞维茨修改完第一篇和第八篇之后便去世了。所以对于什么是战争以及如何打仗，我们可以看到两套截然不同、甚至相互冲突的观点。

Zachary Davis: On War had two legacies. The first way of reading his work—his first version that focused on total war—was popular throughout WWI and WWII.

扎卡里·戴维斯：《战争论》有两大影响。对这本书的第一种解读、也就是第一版《战争论》关注的是全面战争。这种解读在一战和二战期间非常流行。

Gil-li Vardi: If the only thing that matters in war is the battle—battle is by its very definition and character, it's not at all about strategy, it's about tactics. So, if you follow Clausewitz to the most extreme, you know, the logic of it, you don't need strategy that much. You just need a battle or a series of battles. And I would say that for this reason, the Germans are traditionally not very strong on strategy. It’s because they read Clausewitz, right, the first iteration of Clausewitz.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：战争中唯一重要的是战役，而战役就其定义和特点而言涉及的不是战略，而是战术。所以，如果你非常遵循克劳塞维茨的理念，那么按照这个逻辑，你就不是特别需要战略，你只需要一场或一系列战役。由于这个原因，德国人传统上对战略不是很在行，因为他们读过克劳塞维茨第一版的《战争论》。

Gil-li Vardi: You gather your people, you gather your army, and you try to meet the enemy at a certain moment where you have a numerical advantage, and then you strike. And Clausewitz is saying very clearly, “You cannot win a war if you're sticking, if all you're going to do is defend, this will get you nowhere. It's the strongest form of war, but it'll get you nowhere. You need to be, you have to be committed to the offensive. You have to attack. There is no other, you're most vulnerable and most exposed, but there is no other way of winning a war.”

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：你集结你的人民和军队，试图在某个你有数量优势的时刻与敌人相遇，然后发动攻击。克劳塞维茨说得很清楚：“如果你死撑着，只是防守，那就不可能赢得战争，只会一无所获。这是最强大的战争形式，但它会让你无处可逃。你需要也必须全力进攻，尽管这样你最脆弱、最容易暴露，但没有别的办法能赢得战争。”

How were the ideas in the book adopted in the war?

战争中如何运用了书里的理念？

Zachary Davis: Could you share some more specifics about how leaders in the First and Second World War adopted the ideas in this text?

扎克里·戴维斯：您能不能具体谈谈，一战和二战中领导人如何运用了这本书中的思想？

Gil-li Vardi: So, you think of the act, of the military act that started or opened the First World War. It's the Schlieffen Plan. Now, you know, I'm sure everybody knows everything about the Schlieffen Plan, but I'll just cover it briefly here. It's a gigantic act of, a gigantic attempt to capture the French army wherever the French army might be defending, assuming, right, that they will defend Paris. So, if we assume that they will defend Paris, we're trying to get closer to Paris in order to capture the French army there and force a gigantic, decisive battle, one battle that will decide this entire war.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：比如那个制定于一战前的军事计划——施里芬计划。我相信大家都知道施里芬计划的内容，不过我还是简单介绍一下。这是一个大型的计划，试图在任何法军可能防守的地方截住法军。假设他们会保卫巴黎，那我们就会想办法到巴黎附近截住法军，让他们不得不和我们展开一场激烈的、具有决定性的战役。这场战役将决定整个战争的走向。

Zachary Davis: This was critical for Germany, and they had limited time. Russia was gearing up to enter the war in opposition to Germany. Germany only had six weeks before the Russian army began to attack. In addition, Britain was also gearing up to fight Germany. The German army didn’t have the resources to fight France, Russia, and Britain all at once, so capturing France was a strategic move.

扎克里·戴维斯：这个计划对德国很重要，他们的时间很有限。当时，俄国正准备参战反对德国。在俄军开始进攻之前，德国只有六个星期的时间。此外，英国也在准备与德国作战。德军没有足够的资源来同时对抗法国、俄国和英国，所以截住法军是一个战略举措。

Gil-li Vardi: So, you have to, right, if you're a German general, you have to be done with this front within six weeks. And the only way to do it is to follow Clausewitz, force a battle, a decisive one, and you can expect the French to be somewhere near their capital, which is where you're going to catch them and strike. Right? And for this purpose, you will amass most of your army. And that's a huge, huge, big mammoth, right? It's a huge national army. You’ll send most of your soldiers there and, you know, hope for the best.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：没错。如果你是德国将领，且必须在六个星期内攻下这道防线，唯一的办法就是按照克劳塞维茨的理念，强行发动一场具有决定性的战役。你可以推测法国人会在他们首都附近的某个地方部署兵力，于是你就在那儿截住他们并发动进攻。为了达到这个目的，你会集结大部分的兵力，组成一支极为庞大的国家军队，把大部分士兵都派到那儿，期待着最好的结果。

Gil-li Vardi: It's basically, right, if you follow this logic, the Clausewitzian logic, you're forced to gamble. You're forced to put all of your eggs, or, you know, one or two of them, because you only have, you know, one chance, one big battle. So, you will force this big battle, and it's your only chance. You have to gamble. And the thing is that the Germans were this close. They almost won this one. They were very close. And then, of course, they failed.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：按照克劳塞维茨的理念，你就不得不放手一搏。你不得不压上所有赌注，因为你只有这么一次发起大型战役的机会。所以你必须发起这场战役，必须赌一把。结果，德国人差点就成功了。他们差点就赢得了这场战役。虽然是差一点，但结果还是失败了。

Zachary Davis: Now, if the Schlieffen Plan failed, why was Clausewitz not discredited?

扎克里·戴维斯：既然施利芬计划失败了，克劳塞维茨为什么没有名誉扫地呢？

Gil-li Vardi: It was assumed that it wasn't executed in the right way. It was assumed that they didn't put enough soldiers, enough men on the right wing, which was the main wing of the attack. The critique was that, within Germany was that there were not enough forces, as the Schlieffen Plan called for, in the west.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：人们觉得失败原因是因为执行的方式不对，德国没有把足够的兵力放在右翼、也就是进攻的主翼上。德国本国的批评人士认为，西侧没有像施里芬计划要求的那样安排足够兵力。

Zachary Davis: How do you see Clausewitz factoring into World War II strategy? You know, were all sides reading him and trying to adopt his ideas?

扎克里·戴维斯：你如何看待克劳塞维茨对二战战略的影响？是不是各方将领都在阅读他的书、采用他的理念呢？

Gil-li Vardi: So, of course, you know, by the Second World War, you have, everyone had to deal with two things. One was the lessons of the First World War. And the question is, what lesson do you take from the First World War with this huge problem of—and that's, you know, our second problem—modern firepower.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：到了二战时，每个人都要做两件事：一是吸取一战的教训。那么问题就是，你从一战中得到了什么教训。与这个重要问题相伴的还有第二个问题，那就是现代火力。

Gil-li Vardi: Because modern firepower, the reason that the First World War was so destructive was that you read Clausewitz and you send your men to fight, but they meet modern firepower that Clausewitz never had to think about. And it decimates them. I mean, it's, you cannot show yourself, expose yourself in a battlefield. You cannot stand there all exposed to fire because this will mean that you’re dead.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：正是由于现代火力，一战才会有这么大的破坏力。你读了克劳塞维茨的书，派你的人去打仗，但他们遇到了克劳塞维茨从未料到过的现代火力，因而死伤无数。在现代火力面前，你不能在战场上暴露自己，不能暴露在敌军的火力下，不然你就死定了。

Gil-li Vardi: So, what do you do then? Right? You still have Clausewitz. You believe that Clausewitz will give you the key to solution. You have to attack. You cannot just defend and defend. It will give you nothing. So, in the Second World War, you get new ideas. I hate using this word because it's not the word that the Germans were using. But most of us know it as blitzkrieg, right?

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：那你要怎么办？你还有克劳塞维茨的理论，你相信克劳塞维茨会给你解决问题的法宝。你必须进攻，不能只是防御，防御不会给你任何东西。所以在二战中，你有了新的点子，于是出现了我们熟知的“闪电战”。我不喜欢用“闪电战”这个词，因为德军用的并不是这个词，但我们大家都是这么称呼的。

Gil-li Vardi: This idea that you strike deeper, deep into, you know, behind enemy lines, you send your tanks further into the, you know, you are trying to attack the headquarters, and you're not trying to annihilate first thing. What you're trying to do is annihilate headquarters, disconnect, right, this connection between headquarters and the fighting arms. And then you perform military annihilation.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：闪电战需要你更深入地进攻敌军后方，把坦克进一步派到敌军总部。你首先做的不是歼灭总部，而是切断总部与各部队之间的联系，然后再实行歼灭。

Zachary Davis: So, I think World War II is the culmination of total warfare. And then, the adoption or the deployment of the atomic bomb is the end of total warfare because it's too costly for anyone to use it.

扎克里·戴维斯：所以我认为二战是全面战争的高潮。而原子弹的运用和部署结束了全面战争，因为对任何发动全面战争的人来说，代价都太高了。

Gil-li Vardi: Yes, you simply cannot allow it to happen. You know, that's the worst nightmare for everyone.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：没错，你根本不能让它发生。这对每个人来说都是最可怕的噩梦。

Zachary Davis: The second reading of Clausewitz became popular during the cold war, in the years following the Second World War. At this point, both the United States and Soviet Union had developed atomic weapons and fighting a total war with atomic weapons would lead to mass destruction.

扎克里·戴维斯：克劳塞维茨关于战争的第二种解读在冷战期间、也就是二战后的几年里流行起来。此时，美国和苏联都已经研制出了原子武器。若是用原子武器打一场全面战争，将会带来灾难性的后果。

Gil-li Vardi: That's the last war you'll ever fight. So, we need to find a way of avoiding total war, and here's a way of avoiding it. Clausewitz said that we can avoid it if we allow the political rationale to govern war.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：那样的话，那估计会是你打的最后一场战争了。所以我们需要找到一种方法来避免全面战争爆发。这儿就有了一个办法。克劳塞维茨说过，如果我们认为主导战争的是政治理由，我们就能避免战争。

How does the book influence us today?

这本书如今怎样影响着我们？

Zachary Davis: So, is Clausewitz still read and, you know, influential today?

扎克里·戴维斯：如今还有人读克劳塞维茨吗？他还有影响力吗？

Gil-li Vardi: Very much so. I would say that, as I said, after the Second World War, Clausewitz is becoming the champion, not of total war, right? Now, after the Second World War, instead of reading Books Two, Three, Four, or Five, all the way to Book Seven, now what people are reading is Book One and Book Eight, because they suggest that, indeed, wars are limited, and they're limited because of policy, right, because of reason.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：答案绝对是肯定的。正如我之前所说，他在二战后成了赫赫有名的代表人物——当然，不是全面战争理念的代表人物。二战后，人们不再读《战争论》的第二至第七篇，而是读第一和第八篇。这两篇指出战争是受制约的，而且是受到了政策与理性的制约。

Gil-li Vardi: And this is the character of the characteristic that Clausewitz attached to policy: reason. He says people are all about the passion, right? The army and the battle is all about the chance and probability, but policy is all about reason, and reason will rule or will direct our military efforts.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：这就是克劳塞维茨所认为的政策的特点——理性。他说，人们讲究激情，军队和战役讲究机会和概率，但政策讲究的是理性，而理性将约束或指导我们的军事行动。

Zachary Davis: On War is unique because it can be interpreted in two very different, yet accurate ways.

扎克里·戴维斯：《战争论》非常特别，因为它用两种截然不同、但又很准确的方式解读了战争。

Gil-li Vardi: I do see, you know, I've seen this tendency of practitioners tend to read first iteration Clausewitz and, and political scientists tend to read the second iteration Clausewitz. But they're both right. I think, reading Clausewitz as he, you know, focusing on the first iteration is legitimate. I understand, when I read Clausewitz, I understand why most of, you know, military professionals were, found it easier to understand and to follow. It offered them a very clear recipe that they could then, you know, they could take this logic and put it to apply it in the battlefield.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：我看到读者们会有这种倾向：军事界的人倾向于读第一版的《战争论》，而政治学家倾向于读第二版。但他们都是对的。我觉得关注第一版的《战争论》也合情合理。当我读《战争论》时，我可以理解为什么大多数军事专家觉得它很容易理解并付诸实践。它为他们提供了一个非常明了的办法，可以把这套逻辑用在战场上。

Gil-li Vardi: The other reading of Clausewitz, which is, again, very legitimate and absolutely right, became very, it became actually so fashionable and, that it was the only way that the students were introduced. When I was introduced to Clausewitz, it was basically this sort of, you know, policies, you know, the rational, reason in rational policy should rule war. This is what Clausewitz says. I was never introduced to the other parts of Clausewitz.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：《战争论》的另一种解读也完全合乎情理、非常正确。这种解读变得非常流行，甚至学生们只接触过这种解读。当有人给我介绍《战争论》时，基本上都是“政策与政策中的理性应当管好战争”这类的话。他们会觉得这就是克劳塞维茨说的内容，我从来没听过书里别的部分的内容。

Gil-li Vardi: I think these are two legitimate ways of reading him and thinking about wars, and these two ways were tried and tested, and one is better than the other. But historically speaking, you know, I think Clausewitz's is, I think the interpretation, the early interpretations of Clausewitz are very much legitimate. Not morally right or good, but legitimate.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：在我看来，这是两种合理的解读《战争论》并思考战争的方式。这两种方式是经过检验的，而且一个要由于另一个。不过从历史的角度看，《战争论》的两种解读都很合理。第一版的解读也很合理，当然不是说它在道德上是正确的，但它是站得住脚的。

Zachary Davis: Now, what other, what other areas of life or culture do you see Clausewitz influence?

扎克里·戴维斯：你觉得《战争论》还影响了生活或文化中哪些别的领域呢？

Gil-li Vardi: So, Clausewitz is, you know, very much considered a basic textbook right in military academies, when military men are being trained, men and women are being trained, this is what they read. Political scientists are reading him all the time. I assign him in my classes. I don't think there's any, you know, security studies class that can safely, you know, you can safely teach without Clausewitz. He’s very much read. And we are still looking for ways in, you know, we're still trying to understand if the post-Cold War world is something that Clausewitz can be naturally applied to.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：《战争论》在军事院校里被看作一本基本的教科书。军人们接受训练时，读的就是这本书。政治学家们也一直在读他的书，我在课上还会把它作为阅读任务布置下去。我觉得如果没有这本书，就没法放心地教任何一门安全研究课。这本书被广泛阅读。如今，我们仍然在努力探索《战争论》中的理念能否自然而然地应用于后冷战时期的世界。

Zachary Davis: Imagine you're at a cocktail party and a grad student comes up and says, “Professor Vardi, how did On War change the world?”  How do you summarize that big question in one or two sentences?

扎克里·戴维斯：假如您在一个鸡尾酒会上，一个研究生走过来问您：“瓦尔迪教授，请问《战争论》如何改变了世界？”您会怎么用一两句话回答这个大问题呢？

Gil-li Vardi: It gave us the two most important theories of war that served us well all the way from 1832 until this very day.

吉尔·利·瓦尔迪：它给我们提供了两个最重要的战争理论，从1832年一直到今天，这两个理论一直对我们很有帮助。

Zachary Davis: Writ Large is a production of Ximalaya. Writ Large is produced by Jack Pombriant, Liza French and me, Zachary Davis. Script editing is by Galen Beebe. We get help from Feiran Du, Ariel Liu, Wendy Wu, and Monica Zhang. Our theme song is by Ian Coss. Don’t miss an episode. Subscribe today in the Ximalaya app. Thanks for listening. See you next time.

扎卡里·戴维斯：本节目由喜马拉雅独家制作播出。感谢您的收听，我们下期再见！